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Patient MW, a known confabulator, and healthy age-matched controls produced past and 
future events. Events were judged on emotional valence and plausibility characteristics. No 
differences in valence were found between MW and controls, although a positive emotional 
bias toward the future was observed. Strikingly, MW produced confabulations about future 
events that were significantly more implausible than those produced by healthy controls 
whereas MW and healthy controls produced past events comparable in plausibility. A 
neurocognitive explanation is offered based on differences between remembering and 
imagining. Possible implications of this single case in relation to confabulation and mental 














A recent focus in human memory research is the overlap between cognitive processes used in 
retrieving past events from one’s personal life and the construction of imagined future events.  
Neuroimaging and behavioural data suggest that imagining and remembering draw upon 
similar brain regions and mental processes (Abraham, Schubotz & von Cramon., 2008; Addis 
et al., 2007, 2009; Botzung, Denova & Manning, 2008; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2004; Hassabis, Kumaran & Maguire, 2007a; Okuda et al., 2003; Schacter & Addis, 2007) 
and emerges at around 3-5 years of age (see Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Perner & Ruffman, 
1995). In the current paper we examine these issues from a neuropsychological viewpoint. In 
short, does a patient who re-constructs implausible memories of non-existent past events also 
show a similar generation of implausible future events? 
The relationship between remembering and imagining has its roots in neuropsychology – for 
instance, patients with circumscribed amnesia find it difficult to imagine future events (e.g. 
Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann & Maguire, 2007b; patient DB, Klein, Loftus & Kihlstrom, 2002; 
patient KC, Tulving, 1985, 2002). Recently, there has been an upsurge in interest in this 
relationship in healthy populations, and in particular neuroimaging studies (e.g. Addis et al., 
2007, 2009; Botzung, Denvoka & Manning., 2008; Hassabis, Kumaran & Maguire., 2007a; 
Okuda et al., 2003). In these studies, whereby participants are required to reconstruct 
autobiographical events or construct novel but plausible future events, a core network has 
been delineated. This system covers the medial temporal lobe (in particular, the hippocampal 
cortex), posterior cortices and medial prefrontal regions (Abraham, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 
2008; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008; Szpunar, 
Watson, & McDermott, 2007), An emerging consensus is that both past and future events 
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may be mentally constructed using a common episodic construction system (Addis et al., 
2007; Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Schacter & Addis., 2007; Suddendorf, Addis & Corballis., 
2009) or at the least that imagining future events is heavily reliant on memory (Szpunar & 
McDermott, 2008; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Okuda et al, 2003). In particular, 
Addis, Schacter and colleagues have focussed on the novel re-combination of episodic details 
involved in simulating future events and its commonalities with episodic memory (Addis et 
al., 2007, 2009, Schacter & Addis, 2007, constructive episodic simulation hypothesis). One 
underexplored question that may be pertinent to these theoretical perspectives is what 
happens to imagined future events when the autobiographical memory system becomes 
distorted as per confabulation after brain damage. One recent experimental study has found 
that confabulators misrecognise more false autobiographical memories and future events as 
true, recent memories than non-confabulating amnesics (Fotopoulou et al, 2007a). These 
results suggest that the same deficit in reality monitoring may be responsible for 
confabulations, irrespective of their temporal source or context.  
Interestingly, some researchers have tentatively suggested a link between 
remembering and imagining in pathological forms of memory distortion (Dalla Barba, 
Cappelletti,, Signorini, & Denes, 1997; Schacter & Addis., 2007). In two notable studies of 
confabulation (Dalla Barba et al., 1997, 1999), Dalla Barba and colleagues specifically 
assessed future confabulation using a word-cue paradigm and ten questions (e.g. ‘what are 
you going to do in a few minutes?) that mirror ten questions referring to the past 
(Confabulation Battery, Dalla Barba, 1993a). In both tasks they found that the percentage of 
future confabulations was equal to or greater than past confabulations. Intriguingly, a positive 
correlation has been demonstrated between past and future confabulation on the word-cue 
task (Dalla Barba et al., 1997) and the confabulation battery (Lee et al., 2007). In the current 
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paper we emulate this approach but we also aim to compare the qualities of the confabulated 
future and past events and particularly their valence and plausibility characteristics.  
Overall, there are many instances of patients anticipating unlikely personal events in the 
confabulation literature. For example, patients hospitalized for many years confidently insist 
they are only visiting for brief observation and need to go to a meeting; and in some extreme 
cases act upon these false beliefs (e.g. Fotopoulou, Solms & Turnbull., 2004; Schnider, von 
Daniken & Gutbrod, 1996; Talland, 1961). These often mirror the character of plausible past 
confabulations, in the sense that one can trace a relation between the confabulated future 
event and events that occurred in the patient’s pre-injury life. To explain these observations 
and to contextualise our case study, we shall now describe strategic retrieval, source 
monitoring, temporality and motivational explanations of confabulation. 
Strategic retrieval can be defined as higher-level effortful memory processes which 
consist of searching and retrieving details from long-term memory and monitoring their 
relevance based on task demands (Conway, 2005; Moscovitch, 1989; Moscovitch & Melo, 
1997). To date, several authors have argued that confabulation arises out of disruption to 
strategic retrieval processes (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Gilboa, Alain, Stuss, Melo, Miller, & 
Moscovitch, 2006; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997). Supporting evidence for this view comes 
from the fact that confabulations are equally likely to concern post-injury events as they are 
distant pre-injury events (implicating retrieval, not encoding). Furthermore, a combination of 
deficits affecting memory and executive function, typically found in confabulating patients, 
are seen as critical in the disruption of retrieval processes which lead to confabulatory 
behaviour (Gilboa et al., 2006).            
A line of research particularly relevant to this study is source monitoring - the ability 
to reflect upon and accurately determine the origin of stored representations (Johnson, 
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Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). A critical aspect of source monitoring involves distinguishing 
between internally generated mental experiences (e.g. daydreams, imagined scenarios) and 
perceptions derived from external sources (cf. reality monitoring; Johnson & Raye, 1981; 
Johnson, 1991; Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). Importantly, errors of reality 
monitoring resulting from brain damage, such as confusing previous thoughts with actual past 
experiences, can lead to confabulatory behaviour (i.e., Johnson, 1991; Johnson, Hayes, 
D’Esposito & Raye., 2000). However, to date, reality monitoring accounts of confabulation 
have focussed on how impaired reality monitoring can lead to distortions of the past, rather 
than the future (Johnson, 1991; Johnson et al., 2000; see also Turner, Cipolotti & Shallice, 
2010). Under the Multiple-Entry Modular memory framework (Johnson, 1991) a 
neurocognitive system was delineated which consists of perceptual and reflective processes. 
Reflective processes may include using metamemory ‘heuristics’ (e.g. ‘I know it is a memory 
as it is more perceptually rich than an imagined event’ see Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye., 
1988) as well as judgements of the memory’s internal consistency and plausibility. Of interest 
here, confabulation could represent a disruption of reflective source monitoring processes 
(Johnson, 1991). Such reality monitoring processes could apply to future events in the same 
way as for personal memories and the same underlying source monitoring mechanism could 
underlie remembering the past and imagining the future (Johnson & Sherman, 1990). 
Dalla Barba (2002) suggests that confabulation affects all levels of subjective temporality 
(past, present and future). Unlike dense amnesic patients, his patients were aware of their 
own subjective temporality (e.g. patient G.A, Dalla Barba et al., 1997). However this 
invariably corresponded to the patient’s life prior to brain injury as opposed to a reality that 
was currently relevant. In this version of temporality theory, confabulators have a distorted 
rather than non-existent subjective temporality (see Schnider., 2003 for another variation). 
Williams & Rupp (1938) stated that ‘never has the confabulation been a pure fiction 
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emanating from the imagination. Much of the vividness of the confabulation arises from the 
juxtaposition in time of a colourful past contrasted with an uneventful present, and when 
viewed in its proper time sequence, much of its colour is lost’ (p. 401). Following this view, 
temporal confusion theories can account for both apparently fantastic and non-fantastic 
confabulations and may explain why some confabulators have an inaccurate view of their 
past, present and future (e.g. Dalla Barba et al., 1997).  
An alternative view that may account for personal biases in confabulation is that of 
the Self Memory System (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005) whereby 
autobiographical memory forms the basis for understanding the self. The importance of 
motivational aspects of confabulation is demonstrated by the inclusion of personal biases in 
several recent cognitive formulations of confabulation (see Gilboa et al., 2006; Metcalf, 
Langdon & Coltheart., 2007; Fotopoulou et al., 2007b, 2008). Several experimental studies 
provide support for the role of the self in autobiographical memories (Rathbone et al., 2008, 
2009) and future events (Rathbone et al., 2011). Recent evidence examining how the contents 
of long term memory are sampled to imagine future events (Szpunar & McDermott, 2008) 
indicates that inaccurate future plans could reflect distorted autobiographical memories. The 
present or ‘working self’- that dynamically evaluates autobiographical knowledge in relation 
to current goals- may also have an influence in how future selves are envisaged (Conway, 
Pleydell-Pearce, Whitecross, & Sharpe, 2003; Conway, 2005): Distorted or idealised working 
self mental models, therefore, could determine the plausibility (or implausibility) of 
confabulated future events (see Conway & Taachi, 1996 for a case example). 
Indeed, a key concept in the study of confabulation is plausibility and this has been used to 
describe and categorize earlier (Berlyne, 1972; Talland, 1961) and recent (Metcalf, Langdon 
& Coltheart, 2007) observations of the disorder. Plausible confabulations are typically 
grounded in the patient’s pre-morbid habits and lifestyle. Patients often produce a variety of 
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reports that reflect this, including underestimating the current year (e.g. patient GT, Berlyne, 
1972) and claiming they have recently seen loved ones (e.g. patient SD, Metcalf et al., 2007; 
patient MB, Dalla Barba, 1993b) or had been performing household tasks (e.g. patient GA, 
Dalla Barba et al., 1997). Most notably these consist of contextual errors that are derived 
from genuinely experienced events. Implausible confabulations are narratives that are 
qualitatively different from the patient’s actual memories or are generally bizarre or 
improbable. Descriptions of implausible confabulations can be traced back to Korsakoff’s 
initial clinical observations (Korsakoff, 1889/1996). There are several examples of highly 
implausible confabulations resulting from neurological damage. Dalla Barba described a 
patient who, when asked about a previous trip to the cinema, claimed he had met a famous 
Italian TV host (Dalla Barba, 1993a) and Kopelman, Ng & Van den Brouke, (1997) 
described a patient who described her own wedding even though she was unmarried. This 
notion of confabulation resembles ‘fantastic’ confabulation characterised by Berlyne (1972) 
which has been linked specifically with frontal lobe damage (Kopelman, 1987). There are 
more examples of this type in the confabulation literature (e.g. patient E.S., Fotopoulou et al., 
2004; patient A.B., Kopelman et al., 1997), but there are far fewer patients in general who 
consistently produce florid or fantastic confabulations. The bizarre content is often produced 
in severe and acute cases of neurogenic confabulation, although long term confabulators 
similar to the one reported here, have also been documented (Schnider, Ptak, von Daniken & 
Remonda, 2000).   
Despite its usefulness as a concept, some hold reservations over plausibility as a reliable 
measure. This is largely because classifying an account as implausible or bizarre typically 
relies upon subjective judgements which may be affected by preconceptions held by the 
researcher (Kopelman, Ng & Van den Brouke, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000). Also, confusion 
arises in the interpretation of what can be defined as an implausible confabulation. Some 
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confabulations can be internally consistent and probable but dramatically inconsistent with an 
individual’s autobiography (e.g. patient GA, Dalla Barba et al., 1997). On the other hand, 
they can be generally improbable and clearly false (e.g. ‘my dead friend is in New York’, ‘I 
went to have afternoon tea on Mars’). In this study, to overcome these limitations, we used a 
clear conceptual definition of general plausibility which independent judges used to rate 
statements (see Method and Appendix A). This definition, adapted from Scoboria Mazzoni, 
Kirsch & Relyea (2004), specified a plausible event as one that could have occurred or has 
the potential to occur to people in general. To our knowledge, this case study is the first in the 
confabulation literature to formally assess plausibility and may provide a novel characteristic 
with which researchers can assess past and future confabulation. 
In sum, the current study attempted to directly assess the plausibility of 
confabulations produced by a known confabulator. Furthermore, this measure was utilised to 
assess quantitative differences between past and future events produced by a confabulator and 
five healthy age-matched controls. If there are overlapping processes in the remembering of 
past events and the imagining of future events, we might expect to observe equally 
implausible events produced for the past as for the future. If confabulation results from 
temporal confusion or dysfunctional retrieval monitoring then it would seem to be a deficit 
which would equally affect future and past events. To address these issues we used a word-
cue paradigm (Crovitz & Shiffman, 1974) to elicit past and future personal events to explore 
these issues with a persistent confabulator, MW. Considering the relevance of emotional 
valence in confabulation (Fotopoulou, Solms & Turnbull., 2004; Fotopoulou, 2010), we also 
assessed whether MW’s events were more positive than controls’ and attempted to replicate 
the positive emotional bias for future versus past events (e.g. Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; 
Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003).   






MW, a right-handed 63-year old man, had a long career in the Police Force and 
became a Detective Chief Inspector in the late 1980s. He had no known psychiatric history. 
There was no evidence of ‘tale spinning’ before the onset of his injury, and he was described 
as a charismatic and well-respected man, according to his wife and a former colleague. In 
October, 1990 he was found unconscious by his wife. After hospital admission, a CT scan 
indicated a ruptured aneurysm of the anterior communicating artery. The aneurysm was 
clipped, but MW suffered a vasospasm five days later, occluding blood flow and resulting in 
a severe frontal lobe infarction. During subsequent months in the post-operative period, 
clinical notes indicated he was ‘profoundly disoriented in time and place’ and spontaneously 
confabulated. Confabulatory behaviour is not uncommon in the period after an anterior 
communicating artery aneurysm (Metcalf, Langdon & Coltheart, 2007). 
He was discharged to his wife soon after but needed continual care. In the acute stage, 
medical notes indicated that MW reported visual hallucinations of ‘spiders coming out of the 
skirting board’. Later, MW described these earlier experiences to us with emotional distance 
and objectivity. Clinical reports described him as socially disinhibited (e.g. telling 
inappropriate jokes), impulsive, with problems in planning. For these reasons and due to 
some episodes of verbal aggression, MW attended a rehabilitation unit for several years until 
entering supervised community accommodation.  
Confabulation in Everyday Life 
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MW’s confabulations continued from the time of injury through to when our main 
assessments took place 17 years post-injury. His confabulations were momentary and 
spontaneous (Berlyne, 1972). According to carers, MW would confabulate about past 
happenings and future plans at a rate of approximately 5 per day. For example, MW would 
claim he had seen a famous person when visiting town that day despite being supervised by 
the carer the entire time. On one occasion, his wife recalled an incident in which MW said he 
had ‘received a message’ that a close friend had died. However, she was aghast to see the 
friend in question on the high street the week after, especially as she had already sent the 
condolence letter. MW would also tell rehabilitation staff future plans that were patently false 
(e.g. ‘I’m going on that quiz next month’), sometimes specifying the date when they would 
occur, similar to other cases reported by Dalla Barba and colleagues (1997, 1999).  
Neuropsychological Evaluation 
MW’s scores on a range of standardised psychometric tests can be seen in Table 1. MW was 
well oriented to his surroundings and had a Full Scale IQ of 102 on the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS III; Wechsler, 1997a). Across the subtests of anterograde memory, 
MW scores were normal or below average (e.g. visual immediate memory), with a 
significantly reduced Memory Index (84, Wechsler Memory Scale III, 1997b) compared with 
his normal Verbal Intelligence Score (114) which reached significance at the .01 level. 
Interestingly, most of his memory scores were reduced by intra-list and extra-list intrusions 
(often seen as confabulation-like behaviour, e.g. Dalla Barba, 1993b; Fotopoulou et al., 2004; 
Kopelman et al., 1997; Schnider et al., 1996). In addition, MW had difficulty with memory 
tests associated with executive function such as the backward digit span (Standard Score=8, 
25th %ile). In tests designed to assess executive function, MW was impaired on the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, 1993), Brixton Test (Burgess & Shallice, 
1997) and several subtests of the BADS (Wilson et al., 1996). 
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(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
Autobiographical Memory Interview 
We administered the Autobiographical Memory Interview (Kopelman, Wilson & Baddeley, 
1990). MW’s retrograde memory was characterised by errors of commission, not omission: 
all MW erroneous responses about his personal past were confabulatory. To assess the 
veridicality of his responses, a transcription of the interview was sent to his wife. She 
classified his responses as either confabulations or accurate memories, although all responses 
were given with apparent confidence in their accuracy. A greater amount of memories were 
retrieved from childhood and early adulthood and conversely a greater amount of 
confabulations were produced for more recent time periods (Childhood: personal semantic= 
10%,  autobiographical incidents= 33%; Early adulthood; personal semantic = 20%,  
autobiographical incidents= 45% Recent life: personal Semantic= 33%, autobiographical 
incidents= 44%). In terms of confabulations not tied to a specific episode, when asked what 
qualifications he gained, he stated ‘four; GCEs in History, English, Biology, Metalwork’ (his 
wife confirmed that MW gained none of these). In terms of autobiographical events, MW 
either produced repeated confabulations that happened to another individual (He would 
repeatedly re-tell a story of seeing a Lion after a day shift even though he heard this had 
happened to a friend) or events grounded in an accurate personal context with confabulatory 
detail. These mirrored the confabulations he produced in everyday life. 
Confabulation Battery 
To assess his confabulations more formally, the Confabulation Battery (Dalla Barba, 1993a) 
modified for English speakers (Kopelman et al., 1997) was administered which consisted of 
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seven sections including two Don’t Know (DK) sections in which answers are generally 
unknown (e.g. How many Renault cars were sold in 1985?) which assesses the general 
propensity to fill gaps with confabulatory responses in the absence of a correct answer. We 
also included the ‘Future Episodic’ section used previously (Dalla Barba et al., 1997, 1999). 
All responses were transcribed and coded according to Dalla Barba’s criteria (all responses 
except ‘don’t know’ were classed as confabulations in Don’t Know sections). A copy of the 
transcript was also sent to MW’s wife. To corroborate MW’s responses the first author 
consulted rehabilitation staff, medical notes and the transcript returned by MW’s wife.  
Consistent with his performance on the AMI, MW produced false memories on both the 
Personal Semantic (15%) and Episodic (33%) sections. In the Episodic Section, when asked 
his recollection of Princess Diana’s death, his response was: “actually, I got up and switched 
the TV on and I couldn’t believe what I was seeing because I had protected her the year 
before” [actually he had guarded her but before 1990, not in 1996]. It appears that these 
confidently held beliefs were derived from directly experienced happenings or heard of 
events. None of the confabulations in these tests could be defined as ‘semantically 
anomalous’ (Dalla Barba, 1993b) or ‘fantastic’ (Berlyne, 1972). In the Future Episodic 
Section, MW produced plausible future incidents (as confirmed by his wife who gave ‘7’ 
(‘extremely plausible’) ratings for all his responses), and MW said ‘don’t know’ when he was 
unsure of his future plan.  
Summary  
In short, MW retained average intellectual function for his age but showed clear executive 
deficits and scored slightly below average on tests of memory function, demonstrating some 
evidence of confabulatory behaviour under formal testing. MW’s test scores on the AMI and 
Confabulation Battery confirmed a pattern of responses indicative of a confabulating patient. 
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Past – Future Word Cue Task 
Overview of Methods 
We administered MW and controls an adapted version of a standard cue-word task (Crovitz 
& Schiffman, 1974) to elicit (a) eight specific personal memories and (b) sixteen specific 
plausible, semantically and autobiographically, i.e. in the context of his life, future events. 
Considering the data amassed regarding MW’s confabulatory behaviour related to past 
events, we decided to double the amount of cues for the future condition to allow a greater 
understanding of his potential future confabulations. We subsequently asked three 
independent and naive judges to assess the plausibility and valence of event protocols 
originating from MW and five non-confabulating controls. We also asked MW for subjective 
confidence ratings of his own ‘future events’ and subjective ranking of half of them (those 
produced in the first week of the Past-Future Word Cue Task) in terms of plausibility.  
Transcriptions of MW’s confabulations were sent to his wife to calculate the frequency of 
confabulation in each temporal direction. Details of these methods are presented below. 
Control Participants 
In total, five healthy aged participants (2 male) comparable in age (Mean=69.4, SD=4.56, 
Range = 63-75; MW=63), and intellect (National Adult Reading Test; Mean=42.4, SD=2.97; 
MW=41) to MW were recruited from the Institute of Psychological Sciences Older Adult 
Participant Panel and gave written informed consent in accordance with Institute ethical 
procedures. Participants from the control group had no significant psychological or 
neurological disorders and all achieved high Mini Mental State Examination (Folstein, 
Folstein & McHugh, 1975) scores of 29 including MW. Each participant completed past and 
future components of a Past-Future Word Cue Task. 
 




The same eight common nouns (train, market, money, cinema, hospital, letter, mountain, 
restaurant) as Dalla Barba et al (1997, 1999) were used for past and future events in addition 
to a further 8 nouns (house, garden, bar, book, car, gift, bicycle, seaside) which were 
appended to the list of future event cues. Words were presented in large black type on 
separate size A5 white cards.  
Procedure 
Participants were asked to recall plausible personal past events or imagine plausible 
future events, which were unique in time and place and lasted no longer than a day. In the 
future condition, participants were instructed to imagine and describe specific events they 
envisage to plausibly happen in their personal future. All participants performed this task 
individually in a quiet environment. To illustrate the specificity required, participants were 
given an example of a general and specific past and future event. Participants were allowed to 
describe events from any temporal period (recent or remote) and tasks in both conditions 
were participant-paced. To allow participants a chance to practice, two practice trials were 
provided (using the words ‘farm’ and ‘police station’). If participants understood the task, 
they were presented with each cue card separately from the experiment proper and asked to 
describe a past or future event related with that word. If participants appeared to struggle to 
bring to mind an event, the experimenter encouraged participants to produce events related to 
autobiographical life-time periods (e.g. school days for past, retirement/travelling for future). 
Participants were given up to two prompts of the nature ‘that’s fine but can you imagine a 
specific incident related to that situation?’ to encourage specific descriptions. Prompts were 
only given until a coherent event was produced or until both prompts were used. All cue 
words were presented in a pseudo-random order using an online randomiser tool (Urbaniak & 
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Plous, 2007). The order of conditions was not counterbalanced, because of the single case 
design: Participants always started with the ‘memory’ condition. To avoid fatigue and 
concentration problems, MW was tested in two sessions (eight past and eight future cues 
presented in Session 1; an additional eight future cues presented in session 2), conducted one 
week apart. All control participants were tested in a single interview.  
Subjective Ratings 
To assess MW’s subjective experience of the events, two measures were taken. 
Firstly, after each event description, MW was asked to rate how confidently he thought the 
events did happen or would happen in the future (1-7, 1 =no confidence, 7 = extremely 
confident). Secondly, considering only his future events, in the second session, he was 
represented with 8/16 of his future events on separate cards (arranged randomly on the 
interview table) and asked to rank them in order of general plausibility (i.e. the likelihood that 
the event could happen to someone in general). This was included because a rigid adherence 
toward his implausible future events may indicate a more sever disorder concerning MW’s 
ongoing perceptions about his future. On the other hand, acknowledging the improbability of 
his future events would indicate a moderate disorder limited to wilful event generation. 
Corroboration of MW’s Responses  
Transcriptions of MW’s confabulations were sent to his wife to calculate the frequency of 
confabulation in each temporal direction. Past events were classed as confabulations if they 
were incorrect in content or context (or both). Partial errors and inconsistencies were not 
classed as confabulations. Future confabulations were defined as events unlikely to occur to 
MW personally considering his probable future activities (see Dalla Barba et al., 1997). 
Judges’ Plausibility and Valence Scoring  
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A questionnaire was constructed containing all of MW’s statements and a randomly selected 
subset from the five controls participants (10 past, 20 future). Specifically, two events from 
each control participant were included in the past section (30 total ratings) and four from each 
control in the future section (60 total ratings). Statements were randomly intermixed and 
presented in two parts (past, future; same order for each judge).  
Three judges were selected who were all postgraduate students at the University of Leeds. 
Judges were unaware that any statement originated from neurological patient/s and were 
blind to the hypotheses of the study. They were told they would be required to rate a series of 
statements oriented toward either the past or the future. Judges were told that each statement 
was from a different individual and had to rate each statement separately (any common 
information such as location was removed so that judges would not link the origin of 
statements via inter-event consistency).  
To assess the qualities of statements, each judge rated each on a continuous 1-7 scale for 
event plausibility (1=extremely implausible, 7=extremely plausible) and valence (1=negative, 
4=neutral, 7=positive). The definition of plausibility was based on Scoboria et al’s (2004) 
definition of general plausibility. That is, the likelihood that an event will occur in the general 
population. This can be dissociated from personal plausibility: The likelihood a certain event 
could have or will occur to oneself (Scoboria et al., 2004). In line with procedures defined by 
Fotopoulou et al (2007b), valence was rated in terms of the self-representation described in 
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Intraclass correlations (one-way random effects) calculated for both measures indicated a 
moderate to high inter-rater reliability between the three judges (Valence: + .62; Plausibility: 
+.82).  Although inconsistency did exist in that a small proportion of statements rated on 
opposite sides of the mid-point of each scale by different judges (plausibility, .15; valence, 
.15), in these circumstances the mean difference between ratings was only 2.9. Furthermore, 
no statement was rated on opposite extremes of either scale (i.e. 1 and 7).  
Event Production and Corroboration Scores 
On average, healthy controls produced 7.8 (SD=0.5) past events and 14.6 (SD=1.1) future 
events. MW produced 7 past events (z score = -1.6) and 16 future events (z score = 1.3). In 
terms of confabulation frequency, MW’s wife identified as confabulations fewer past events 
(57%) than future events (95%).  
Qualities of Past and Future Events 
Judges’ ratings of Plausibility of Past and Future Events 
The different pattern in ratings associated with the past and future statements produced by 
MW and controls are illustrated in the frequency distributions presented in Table 2. To 
illustrate the type of events produced by MW, a sample of representative past and future 
events are presented in Appendix B. To explore whether MW’s mean plausibility rating 
differed significantly from the control group, two modified t-tests for single case designs 
were conducted separately for past and future events (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002). This 
method is preferable to z scores as it uses a t distribution based on the control statistics rather 
than estimated population parameters (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002). Furthermore, to 
provide more conservative probability estimates of MW’s performance, two-tailed (rather 
than one-tailed) tests were applied. This analysis showed that past events produced by 
controls and MW did not differ in their plausibility, t(4)= -0.29, p = .79 [z score = -.31] (see 
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Table 3 for mean and SD results). When MW’s responses were split into confabulations and 
true memories (4 confabulations, 3 corroborated events), only confabulated events differed 
somewhat from past events produced by healthy controls, but this difference was not 
significant as assessed by this small number of events (confabulations, M=3.5, SD=1.8, z = -
1.13, t(4) = -0.91, p = .41; verified, M=6.0, SD=0.9, z = .56, t(4) = 0.51, p = .64, Crawford & 
Garthwaite (2002)’s t-test).  
(Insert Table 2 about here)  
(Insert table 3 about here) 
For future events, MW’s statements were significantly less plausible than those produced by 
controls, t(4) = -3.65, p < .05, two-tailed [z score = -4.0]. Although around 85% of MW’s 
future events were rated on the implausible side of the scale, this was only the case for 3% of 
all events produced by controls. Subdividing future events into plausible and implausible 
events as judged by MW’s spouse (providing an analogue to the analysis with past events) 
was unfeasible as only 1/16 of these was classed as personally likely (‘Most likely to happen 
to me in the future is that I’ll go into hospital and probably die there’).  
It was also optimal to directly assess whether the difference in plausibility between MW’s 
past and future events was statistically significant. Following the recommendations for testing 
for dissociations between two tasks in single case studies when the N of the control group is 
small, the Bayesian Standardized Difference Test was applied (Crawford, Garthwaite & 
Howell, 2009). This test showed that the difference in MW’s scores could be classed as a 
classic dissociation (p < .05) as a difference was exhibited in the future but not past condition 
(verifying the above analyses) and there was a sufficiently large standardized difference 
between the past and future when compared with the control sample scores. Furthermore, it 
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was estimated that 1.3% (95% CI, 0.00 – 13.8) of the normal population would be expected 
to exhibit a greater degree of dissociation between past and future scores than MW. 
Judges’ ratings of Valence of Past and Future Events  
Two separate, modified t-tests were also calculated for emotional valence (Crawford & 
Garthwaite, 2002). These indicated no significant differences between the emotional valence 
of MWs events compared to the control group for past [t(4) = -0.43, p = .69] or future 
statements [t(4) = 0.30, p = .78]. These findings were confirmed when z scores were 
computed for past (z = -.47) and future (z = .33) events, showing only small deviations from 
the sample means. Dividing MW’s past events into accurate and confabulatory responses led 
to similarly non-significant findings (confabulations, M=3.2, SD=1.5, t(4) = -0.55, p = .61; 
verified, M=3.8, SD=2.3, t(4) = -0.23, p = .83, Crawford & Garthwaite (2002)’s t-test). The 
Bayesian Standardized Difference Test showed that the pattern of MW’s valence ratings 
could not be defined as a dissociation (p = .56) with an estimated 28% (95% CI, 5.2% - 62.8) 
of the population exhibiting a greater past-future discrepancy than MW.  
As can be observed in Appendix B, many of MW’s future events rated as implausible were 
prima facie wishful. To explore the emotional characteristics of his future confabulations, a 
correlation between emotional valence and plausibility ratings (on MW’s 48 future event 
ratings) was conducted. This revealed a significant relationship between valence and 
plausibility such that implausible future events were more likely to be given positive ratings, 
Spearman’s r =  -.37, p < .01. This was not the case however for healthy controls, 
Spearman’s r = -.20, p = .14. 
Generally, results indicated that past events were rated around the neutral scale point (MW 
and controls combined, M=3.86, SD=1.82; 95% confidence intervals, 3.35 - 3.38), whereas 
future events were rated as somewhat positive (MW and controls combined, M=4.90, 
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SD=1.26; 95% confidence intervals, 4.66 - 5.14). Thus some evidence demonstrating a 
positivity bias was found for future versus past events for MW and healthy controls (see 
Table 3).   
Subjective Awareness  
Confidence in Past and Future Events 
Following each event description, MW was asked to report the extent to which he believed 
the event occurred in his personal past and to what extent he believed each future event was 
likely to occur some time in the future. On a scale from 1-7 (1 indicating no confidence, 7 
indicating certainty), MW responded 7 to all his past and future events. These ratings 
reflected the confident tone with which MW described past and future events.  
Perception of Future Events  
Although independent ratings were analysed, it was also important to gain an understanding 
of the future events from MW’s perspective. In contrast to immediate responses made after 
each event, when asked to rank the events in terms of plausibility, MW placed 75% of his 
own future events (6/8) on one side of the table and stated that they were implausible. He 
then indicated that only two imaginings were plausible, i.e. ‘Most likely to happen to me in 
the future is that I’ll go into hospital and probably die there.’ and ‘Trains will become 
supersonic [SNC: where will you be?] I will be flying one.’: The former example coinciding 
with his wife’s categorisation of this future event as personally plausible and the latter 
example was clearly personally and generally implausible. MW therefore correctly identified 
one plausible future event from 7 options. Interestingly, he also stated that many events were 
‘merely wishful’. When the researcher asked directly whether his future events were a ‘wish, 
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dream or desire’, MW answered ‘Yes’ in response to all future events except: ‘I will most 
likely die in hospital’1.  
 





Neuropsychological investigations have found parallel deficits in episodic future thinking and 
episodic memory (e.g. Hassabis et al., 2007b; Levine et al., 1998; Tulving, 1985, 2000). The 
current investigation focussed on the distortion of mental time travel into the past and future 
in a known confabulator. Patient MW persistently confabulates in everyday life after 
suffering prefrontal damage (verified by neuropsychological and medical data). On testing, 
MW confabulated across all domains of autobiographical knowledge (except for orientation 
to the present), but performed normally on tests of general semantic knowledge and 
intelligence. When asked to generate past and future events in a cue-word paradigm, a 
positive bias was found; future events were more emotionally positive than past events. This 
finding was consistent across MW and controls. However, MW’s future (but not past) events 
were dramatically more implausible than those produced by age-matched healthy controls. 
The theoretical implications in relation to confabulation and mental time travel are discussed. 
Turning first to emotional valence, it is noteworthy that the current study replicated a 
common finding in the mental time travel literature. That is, although past and future events 
are generally positive, future events display an additional positive bias (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 
2008; Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003). Furthermore, Newby-Clark & Ross (2003) found that 
individuals take longer to generate negative (versus positive) future happenings, whereas 
latencies for positive and negative past events were equivalent. In the current study, a positive 
future bias was demonstrated across the valence ratings for healthy controls and MW. Even 
though this study used independent valence ratings, it further demonstrates the human 
tendency toward perceiving the future as favourable, positive or even idealised (Newby-Clark 
& Ross, 2003)2.  
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Considering recent formulations of episodic memory, can the present findings regarding 
plausibility be interpreted in the context of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis 
(Schacter & Addis, 2007), which assumes that the generation of past and future events relies 
on a core neuro-cognitive network (see Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2007)? Intriguingly, the 
fact that temporal direction (past or future) determined the plausibility of MW’s statements 
suggests that future event construction may be more sensitive than episodic memory to 
damage extending to the prefrontal lobes. Taking a broader perspective, this difference might 
be explained by specific differences between episodic memory and episodic future thinking. 
Namely, although episodic memory does not represent an exact mental replay of experience 
(Bartlett, 1932; Schacter & Addis, 2007), memory retrieval has a single ‘destination’: That is, 
a memory search is conducted to elicit a single experienced event which is re-activated at 
retrieval (Moscovitch et al., 2005). Future event construction is more flexible: The future has 
not happened and multiple permutations can be envisaged. This makes classifying 
confabulations concerning a future especially difficult as judgements must depend on 
likelihood rather than memorial evidence (see below for further discussion).  
In support of this idea, in a recent fMRI study, Addis et al. (2009) found that flexibly 
combining details into a novel event was associated with greater activity in the medial PFC 
and anterior hippocampus when contrasted with remembering a personal event. This 
replicated previous findings which associated future thinking with additional activity in 
prefrontal regions (Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003). Although mnemonic 
details are sampled when constructing the future, it is most likely the intensive combination 
of details that place additional demands upon executive processes. Subsequently, differential 
activity in prefrontal regions has been attributed to processes specific to imagination rather 
than prospection per se (Addis et al., 2009). As a result of using additional executive 
resources, imagined events often take longer to generate and result in less specific 
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representations (Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, Whitecross, & Sharp, 2003; D'Argembeau & Van 
der Linden, 2004; Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009). Thus, where executive processes are limited 
in MW, it is possible that the additional reconstruction processes may disproportionately 
reduce monitoring of future events (although still affecting past event monitoring to a 
moderate extent), hence why less plausible events were observed when they were imagined in 
the future rather than remembered. The contrasting plausibility of MW’s past and future 
events may reflect specific differences between processes involved in remembering and 
imagining events. Of course, semantic memory may also have a role in generating and 
monitoring past and future-oriented thoughts (see Klein, Loftus & Kihlstrom, 2002). 
However, a satisfactory examination of differences between episodic and semantic thoughts 
about the past and future (in healthy and brain damaged populations) was beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
The temporality account described by Dalla Barba and colleagues (1997) implies that 
confabulation can affect past, present and future. MW’s pattern of responses appears 
concordant with this view. In particular, his claim to have protected Princess Diana on the 
AMI was derived from MW’s actual experience as a police officer but was temporally 
displaced by around 7 years. However, several points counter the view that all temporal 
domains are similarly affected by confabulation. MW confabulated when asked about his 
personal past and future (on the Confabulation Battery and Cue-word Task), but provided an 
accurate account of his present circumstances (orientation sections of Confabulation Battery 
and RBMT). Also, in a recent study of Alzheimer’s patients, past and future confabulations 
correlated positively, whereas present orientation failed to correlate with either (Lee et al., 
2007). Thus, there may be differences between present orientation and other forms of 
subjective time which involve mental time travel (Tulving, 1985).  
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The case described here is more consistent with a deficient executive function explanation of 
confabulatory behaviour as MW demonstrated clear impairments on classic tests of executive 
function (e.g. WCST, see Table 1) and displayed everyday behaviours (see DEX scores) and 
a pathology consistent with a dysexecutive syndrome. Furthermore, MW failed to display 
florid confabulations on memory tests with greater experimenter-cues (e.g. Confabulation 
Battery), which was in stark contrast to his responses on word-cue tasks in which strategic 
searches are self-guided: In the Cue-word task MW produced 57% past and 95% future 
confabulations compared with a 30% for the Autobiographical Memory Interview and 
Confabulation Battery, as verified by his wife and rehabilitation staff.  Therefore the data 
presented here lends itself to an explanation of confabulation by which strategic retrieval 
dysfunction (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Gilboa et al., 2006; Metcalf et al., 2007; Moscovitch 
& Melo, 1997) leads to errors in distinguishing the sources of mental representations 
(Johnson, 1991; Johnson et al., 2000; Turner et al., 2010). In fact, bizarre or fantastic 
confabulations are associated with disruption of the executive reflective component of source 
monitoring (Johnson, 1991). In Johnson’s words, ‘without the past and the reality-checking 
processes that evaluate imagined futures against the backdrop of the past people could make 
up and visualise any future’ (p. 514, Johnson, 1990). This is consistent with the idea of a 
mechanism of deficient reality checking underlying confabulation which normally constrains 
and monitors images the future.  
Although MW’s fantastic future simulations did not differ in valence from the similar 
productions of controls, both were positive in valence. A range of research indicates that 
confabulation can be modulated by motivation (Conway & Taachi, 1996; Fotopoulou et al., 
2004; 2007b; 2008; 2010). According to the affective impulsivity hypothesis (see Fotopoulou, 
2008; 2010), false constructions become self-enhancing as a consequence of reduced 
executive control over confabulatory content. This hypothesis offers an explanation of the 
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positive emotional bias observed in confabulatory content compared with responses derived 
from non-confabulators (e.g. Fotopoulou et al, 2004; 2007a & b) and, specifically, why 
MW’s more implausible future events were more likely to be emotionally positive. Although 
the case presented here did not replicate the particular emotional bias found in these studies 
because there was not a difference between MW and controls, some of the repeated 
confabulations of MW seem consistent with this hypothesis. The majority of MW’s future 
events were characterised by holding powerful positions (e.g. owning a bicycle shop, Mount 
Kilimanjaro, and a beach resort, see Appendix B). It is possible that a lack of cognitive 
control increased the prevalence of wished-for, implausible future events. Furthermore, the 
cognitive bias toward wished-for events could have resulted from MW’s distorted working 
self model (see Conway, 2005) of unrealistic, limitless possibilities. Several researchers have 
acknowledged the relation between confabulations and personal biases (Metcalf et al., 2007), 
habits (Dalla Barba, 2002) or goals/wishes (Conway & Taachi, 1996; Conway, 2005). In 
MW, it was speculated that the relatively rare (implausible) distortions of past and future 
produced by MW may have represented MW’s underlying pattern of preferences and 
personal goals. 
Some apparent paradoxical findings in terms of MWs future statements deserve attention. 
The fact that MW probably retained knowledge of the task instructions throughout testing 
sessions (on commencing the second testing session, MW was asked to tell the experimenter 
the instructions of the future event task. He responded “you want me to give you some details 
of the future which are plausible” (verbatim)), and indeed accurately described his future 
events as ‘merely wishful’ - whilst being unable to produce more than one plausible future 
event - may appear somewhat surprising. However, it is plausible that MW could not apply 
that awareness specifically at the time of event construction. Firstly, it is largely agreed that 
confabulation is beyond conscious manipulation but is a by-product of reduced cognitive 
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control at retrieval (Conway, 2005; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997): As such, the concept of 
confabulation as ‘lying’ or filling gaps in memory have been largely discarded (see 
Schneider, 2008 for a review). Secondly, a recent study which explored patterns of event-
related potentials in a group of confabulating amnesic patients indicated an early top-down 
monitoring process beyond conscious awareness (Gilboa, Alain, He, Stuss & Moscovitch, 
2009). Lastly, if MWs confabulations were conscious ‘lies’ or fabrications, MW would have 
remained consistent in this lie throughout testing (e.g. repeating his fantastical plans) but this 
was not the case. According to Crosson and colleagues (1989) it is possible to have 
intellectual awareness (the knowledge that one has certain aberrant behaviours associated 
with organic deficits) without awareness of a deficit when it occurs. Similarly, with reference 
to the Multiple-Entry Modular framework (Johnson, 1991), MW’s confabulatory deficit may 
be traced to a dysfunction of habitual reflective processes (i.e. mistaking wishful thoughts or 
intentions for likely future events) which was not correctly rectified by reflective processes 
typically under wilful executive control. In a particular way though, presenting MW with a 
set of his own future plans caused recognition of their implausible content. In this context, 
MW may have had an abstract awareness of his confabulations, without an ability to apply 
this to his confabulatory behaviour spontaneously. A possible avenue for researchers of 
confabulation might be to elucidate if confabulators are necessarily unaware of their false 
accounts, memory defects and the other disorders.  
In this case study of ‘future confabulation’ we chose a dimension – general plausibility – to 
distinguish MW’s future events from controls. This proved useful as a marker of 
confabulation as future events could not be verified by relatives/rehabilitation staff as with 
memories. Also, it is acknowledged there is some circularity in considering implausible 
future events confabulatory per se and that plausibility is orthogonal to the clear 
classifications that can be obtained for past confabulations (see also Berryhill et al., 2010). 
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There are of course other ways in which confabulations could be conceptualised apart from 
their general plausibility and it may be interesting to explore its link with personal plausibility 
as Scoboria and colleagues (2004) had done in healthy adults. We would encourage the 
consideration of a coherent and reliable method of distinguishing confabulated from plausible 
future events.  
In conclusion, MW’s case provides an interesting insight into past and future thinking and 
confabulation. Case studies can be extremely insightful in cognitive neuropsychology, 
especially in the recent literature on mental time travel (see Schacter & Addis, 2007). The 
data from MW indicates that dimensions of past and future event construction may be 
dissociated. Although past and future event construction involves overlapping processes, the 
unknown nature of the future may increase the implausible nature of confabulations. 
However, systematic group studies will be necessary to assess the generality of this finding to 
other confabulating patients.  
 






1.No control data is available for comparison. 
2.It is noteworthy that the positivity bias could have been due to the more advanced age of 
MW and the control participants. However, to our knowledge, the future positivity bias has 
only been investigated in young healthy adults (e.g. Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Newby-
Clark & Ross, 2003). Therefore to answer the question of whether this particular bias exists 
in older age requires further empirical investigation, possibly comparing the bias in young 
and old participants.  
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Table 1: Scores on Standard Neuropsychological Measures  
 
Note: RBMT = Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test – II (Wilson, Cockburn & Baddeley, 
2003) BADS = Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (Wilson et al., 1996), 
DEX Questionnaire = Dysexecutive Questionnaire measuring the frequency of dysexecutive 
behaviours on a 0-4 likert-type scale, WCST =Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton, 1993) 
 
Psychometric Tests Score Description  





Tests of Memory 
Index Scores 






WMS-III    
Visual Immediate 





Auditory Delayed 105 Average 







General Memory 84 Low Average 
 Raw Scores  
RBMT Orientation 14/14 Normal 
RBMT Total Screening 
Score 
  7/12 Poor Memory 
RBMT Profile Score 16/24 Moderately Impaired 
   
Tests of Executive Function    
Hayling & Brixton Tests Scaled Scores   
Hayling Total 5 Moderate Average 
Hayling 2 Errors 4 Low Average 
Brixton Test 2 Impaired 
BADS    
DEX Questionnaire (0=never ,4=very often)   
DEX MW self-report ratings M=0.95 (SD= 1.36)   





Action Programme 4 0.44 
Key Search 4 1.06 
Temporal Judgement 1 -2.36 
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Zoo Map 2 -0.48 
Modified Six Elements 2 -1.90 
Age-corrected Standard 
Score 
88 Low Average 
WCST    
Categories completed 1  Impaired (10%ile) 
Perseverative errors 58%  Impaired (<1%ile) 
Non-perseverative errors 5%  Impaired(<1%ile) 




Table 2: Distribution of Plausibility Ratings (in percentages)  
 
Note: Percentages were used as each condition varied in the absolute amount of ratings 
recorded (see Results). CG = Control Group 
 
Response Past Future 
 MW CG MW CG 
1/implausible 10.0 3.3 60.4 0.0 
2 10.0 6.7 16.7 0.0 
3 10.0 3.3 8.3 3.3 
4 10.0 13.3 4.2 5.0 
5 25.0 26.7 10.4 18.3 
6 20.0 26.7 0.0 48.3 












Table 3:  Mean (SD) ratings for Past and Future Events  
 
Note: For plausibility, the 1-7 scale was unidirectional 1=extremely implausible, 7 = 
extremely plausible, whereas for emotional valence, the scale was bi-directional, 1=negative, 
4 = neutral, 7 = positive. 
 
 Past Future 
 MW CG MW CG 
Plausibility 4.6 (1.9) 5.1 (1.6) 1.9 (1.3) 5.9 (1.0) 
Valence 3.4 (1.9) 4.2 (1.7) 5.1 (1.3) 4.7 (1.2) 
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Appendix A.   
Instructions given to Independent Judges: 
Instructions for Scoring Past Events 
You will be shown some memories from a number of different individuals. I would like you 
to judge the valence (pleasantness/unpleasantness) and plausibility of each event.  
Valence 
For each event below, consider the following: Is there anything in the way the memory is 
described which suggests this was a positive (e.g. ‘I bought a house for my son, which made 
me very happy’), neutral (e.g. ‘I went to the shops and bought a fridge-freezer’) or negative 
event (e.g. ‘I was dragged to a wedding last month and I had to speak to people I really didn’t 
like’)? Please rate the statement for valence on a 7-point scale (4=Neutral).  
Plausibility 
Then, in terms of plausibility, consider the degree you believe that the event could have 
occurred or has the potential to occur to people in general. In other words: Is there anything 
in the way the memory is described (e.g. the setting or time) which indicated it is an 
implausible (e.g. ‘In 1880 I went go on holiday with my family’ or ‘I went to Mars for my 
last birthday’) or extremely plausible memory (e.g. ‘Last year I went to buy a ticket at 
Kensington Station before boarding the tube train’)? Please rate the statement for plausibility 
on a 7-point scale (1=Not at all Plausible, 4=Moderately Plausible, 7=Extremely Plausible). 
Instructions for Scoring Future Events 
You will be shown some personal future events from a number of different individuals. I 
would like you to judge the valence (pleasantness/unpleasantness) and plausibility of each 
event.  
Valence 
For each event below, consider the following: Is there anything in the way the plan is 
described which suggests this will be a positive (e.g. ‘I will buy a house for my son, which 
will make me very happy’) neutral (e.g. ‘I will go to a shop to buy a fridge-freezer’) or 
negative (e.g. ‘I will get dragged to a wedding next month and I will have to speak to people I 
really don’t like’). Once you have considered these points, please rate the statement for 
valence on a 7-point scale (4=neutral).  
Plausibility 
Then, in terms of plausibility, consider the degree you believe that the event could occur or 
has the potential to occur to people in general. In other words, is there anything in the way the 
future event is described (e.g. the setting or time) which indicates it is an implausible (e.g. ‘In 
2600 I will go on holiday with my family’ or ‘I will go to Mars for my next birthday’) or 
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extremely plausible plan (e.g. ‘Next year I will go to buy a ticket at Kensington Station 
before boarding the tube train’)? Please rate the statement for plausibility on a 7-point scale 
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Appendix B.  
Representative Examples of Past and Future Statements 
MW’s Past Statements MW’s Future Statements 
Accurate Memory 
Cue Word: Train 
MW: I remember when I was a kid 
going to Cornwall with my parents and 
we got straight through tickets and I was 
entrusted to keep the tickets, and when 
we got to King’s Cross station I’d lost 
the tickets on to Cornwall…so we had to 
pay again. 
Mean Plausibility Rating: 6.00  
Mean Valence Rating: 1.67 
Confabulation 
Cue word: Hospital 
MW: I came home from work one 
night…I said to the wife ‘I’ve got a 
terrible headache C’ and went to bed. 
The next thing I know I wake up in 
Intensive Care in the Royal 
Infirmary…and I died twice…and the 
Professor that saved me went mad…he 
turned up at work one day unshaven in 
pyjamas..and the sister said to him 
‘Professor, you’re supposed to be 
operating Today’, and he looked at her 
and said ‘Sister, I am doing no more 
operations’, and he walked out the 
hospital and nobody’s seen him since. 
Mean Plausibility Rating: 2.33 




Comparison Past Event 
Cue word: House 
Cue Word: Mountain 
MW: I will buy mount Kilimanjaro and 
Mount Fuji  
[prompt for a specific event] 
MW: Rent them out, if Sir Anthony 
Hopkins can own Snowdon, and Sean 
Connery can own Ben Nevis, I can own 
Kilimanjaro! 
[prompt for a specific event] 
MW: I would live right on the summit of 
mount Fuji. I would have one there and 
one on Kilimanjaro  
Mean Plausibility Rating:1.33 
Mean Valence Rating: 5 
Cue word: Train 
MW: Trains will become supersonic. I 
will be driving one. 
Mean Plausibility Rating: 1.00 
Mean Valence Rating: 6.33 
Cue word: Garden 
MW: I own a garden on the moon and all 
the other planets. 
[prompt for a specific event] 
MW: I will have them on all the planets 
and I will grow plants indigenous to the 
planets 
Mean Plausibility Rating: 1.00 
Mean Valence Rating: 4.33 
Comparison Future Event 
Cue word: House 
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Control Participant: “Yeah I suppose it 
was looking at our son who was getting 
married, was looking for houses and we 
went to look at one somewhere in the 
Shipley area because his wife had got a 
job teaching there, and we went to look 
round this house with her parents as well 
and we all sort of gave our little bit of 
opinions, kitchen floor looked a bit damp 
but on the whole for the price it seemed 
ok and then as we drove away my son 
suddenly realised although most of the 
houses were privately owned...” 
Mean Plausibility Rating: 5.67 
Mean Valence Rating:2.67  
Control Participant: “It’s back, my 
daughter, her big house, family house is 
on the market and she’ll be looking for a 
new one um I imagine it will be smaller 
perhaps three bedrooms (PROMPT) 
yeah, um yep no doubt I shall be helping 
to clean it whilst she moves in um and 
saying ‘does that look right there or does 
that look right there?’ and probably 
weeding the garden. Don’t think I’ll offer 
to do any decorating this time, I might 
tidy the garden um and help make the 
beds up.” 
Mean Plausibility Rating: 5.67 
Mean Valence Rating: 4.67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
